I've been slogging my way through Herbert Blumer's classical treatise on Symbolic Interactionism. Important - not exactly a page turner. He explains the assumptions of symbolic interactionism (basically, that we create society from moment to moment through our interactions with each other, and that we act based on a shared sense of meaning of objects and situations and perceptions). He also dives into research methodology, and condemns his contemporary peers for scientific studies that fail to incorporate real observations and experiences and analyses of "the empirical world" as he calls it. In other words, we can't start hypothesizing or designing surveys or drawing conclusions about an aspect of society if we have not established the validity of our mental images or theoretical frameworks about that topic. "The predominant procedure," he asserts, "is to take for granted one's premises about the nature of the empirical world and not to examine those premises; to take one's problems as valid because they sound good, to regard as empirically valid the data one chooses because such data fit one's conception of the problem; to be satisfied with the empirical relevance of one's concepts because they have a nice connotative ring or because they are current intellectual coins of the realm" (pg. 33). We are far more likely to allow our theories and concepts to "coerce the research" to suit one's form. "In this sense, much current scientific inquiry in the social sciences is actually social philosophizing" (p. 34).
Whenever we study an area of society, we come to it with unconscious stereotypes and biases, assumptions that we make, a picture we have created based on our previous experiences. Blumer argues that we cannot solve that problem by diving into a scientific study - in fact, that will likely worsen the problem because then we feel SURE that we KNOW something, when in fact we have only found ways to validate our preexisting notions.
There are so many good examples. Blumer points out the popularity of intelligence tests, and how merely operationalizing the concept of intelligence (so we can measure it!) doesn't actually mean we're measuring what we claim to measure. Anyone who knows a good military strategist, or a slum survivor, or a brilliant poet, or an ingenious business developer recognizes that the type of competence measured by intelligence tests captures only a small fragment of what may be characterized as intelligence.
Another example: Good research in the 1930's hypothesized that the facial or cranial features of an individual were related to their criminal conduct. "Negroid" features in particular were characteristic of all kinds of negative social behaviors. This research was usually done correctly - they asked the research question, they may have had a good sample size, their statistical analysis was probably spot on, and the resulting data proved that black people were more likely to be socially inferior, as demonstrated by their clearly inferior physical makeup. The research validated all of the racist dogmas and policies of the time. Just because a hypothesis was tested, however, does not mean truth was discovered. At no point was there a practical exploration of the premises of the study, or whether the concepts made sense, or whether the methodology truly captured what was going on, or whether the conclusions were actually borne out. Truth can only come from a "direct examination of the empirical world."
In modern terms, Blumer emphasizes the critical first component of the scientific method, which is observation. A theoretical framework can't "talk back" to us the way empirical reality can. Empirical reality comes from firsthand acquaintance with the sphere of life - "free exploration in the area, getting close to the people involved in it, seeing it in a variety of situations they meet, noting their problems and observing how they handle them, being party to their conversations, and watching their life as it flows along."
Furthermore, "the scholar who lacks that firsthand familiarity is highly unlikely to recognize that he is missing anything" (p. 37). Our focus on correct scientific protocol "becomes the unwitting substitute for a direct examination of the empirical social world."
This direct examination requires flexibility, doing whatever is ethically allowable to get a clearer picture of what is going on. he should "cultivate assiduously a readiness to view his area of study in new ways...to ask all kinds of questions, even seemingly ludicrous questions...to sensitize the observer to different and new perspectives...to record all observations that challenge one's working conceptions as well as any observation that is odd and interesting even though its relevance is not immediately clear." Darwin was the master of this strategy of exploration, asking new and different questions, writing down observations that later became "the pivots for a fruitful redirection of (his) perspective." Better description alone often answers questions without having to evoke a fancy, complicated theoretical scheme.
I hope no one has fallen asleep yet. This is what I read for fun.
Now let's talk about LESBIANS...
A friend commented on the statistic that most lesbians first sexual experiences were rape or some other kind of sexual assault. How do we interpret this? Well, there are many ways - some would say that rape causes one's orientation to change, some might claim that orientation can't change and therefore lesbian girls are more likely to find themselves in precarious situations, some would say it doesn't matter, orientation is as important as yogurt preference...there are many ways to interpret this fact. Normally, I would jump to theorizing as well. But in the spirit of Herbert Blumer, maybe we're getting ahead of ourselves...
How many of us who are jumping to conclusions about this topic have significant personal experience with the world of middle and high school girls and their sexual feelings, attitudes and experiences? (Having been a teenage girl at one point doesn't count) If we don't, we may not realize that we are missing something...we may not realize that the very picture from which we are arguing is flawed. The concepts themselves may be misleading. Our premises may be totally missing the mark. Without a doubt, our conceptualization of the issue is far less complete and complex than the reality we claim to be discussing. We may actually be debating a cartoon version of empirical reality.
Without claiming to have conducted significant ethnographic research in this particular area, let me throw out a guess. I would guess, that if we were to interview hundreds of teenage girls about their sexual feelings, attitudes and experiences, we would find that they are rarely simple, linear, or naturally prone to be categorized. I would guess that what girls and women find arousing is more than just about sex but also body types and parts, external vs. internal characteristics, experiences, time, moods, and social climate.
Maybe trying to decide whether someone is "lesbian" or "gay" or even softening the line with "bisexual" assumes a picture of sexuality that is far too simplistic. If we followed Blumer's cue and acquainted ourselves with this area of research WITHOUT prematurely attaching labels to our findings and concepts, without theorizing what we will find in advance and then devising methods to validate it, our experience with reality - the "reality of the empirical world" - might actually lead us to some interesting discoveries. My guess is, those discoveries would encourage us to shy away from any kind of sexual labels and instead teach us something really remarkable about ourselves.
